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This memorandum analyzes the split among the United States Courts of Appeals and
what factors each Court of Appeals considers in deciding whether to approve a nonconsensual
third-party release. Today, the dispute among circuit courts can be attributed to each circuit’s
perspective on the statutory relationship between section 524(e) and section 105(a) of the
Bankruptcy Code. Section 524(e) provides that a “discharge of a debt of the debtor does not
affect the liability of any other entity on, or the property of any other entity for, such debts.”2
Courts in the Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits hold the majority
view and consistently agree that section 524(e) is not an explicit limitation on the courts’ section
105(a) equitable powers. Whereas the Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits hold the minority view
that the statutory language of section 524(e) provides a strict prohibition against third-party
releases. This Circuit split is not new, but rather has been afflicting the federal circuit courts
since the early 1980s. However, recently with the public outrage surrounding the Purdue Pharma
bankruptcy, and specifically the Sackler family’s role in effectuating the opioid crisis, there is
suddenly much publicity and controversy surrounding nonconsensual third-party releases as a
matter of law and public policy.
Discussion
I.

Circuit Split on Nonconsensual Third-Party Releases
A. Majority View
The majority of the United States Courts of Appeals – the Second, Fourth, Sixth,

Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits – employ various tests to determine whether nonconsensual thirdparty releases and injunctions are permissible.3 Further, the First and D.C. Circuits have

11 U.S.C. § 524(e).
See SEC v. Drexel Burnham Lambert Grp., Inc. (In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Grp., Inc.), 960 F.2d 285, 293 (2d
Cir. 1992); In re Cont’l Airlines, 203 F.3d 203, 213 (3d Cir. 2000); In re A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 880 F.2d 694 (4th
2
3
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indicated they also find such releases permissible; however, neither circuit has addressed the
issue of nonconsensual third-party releases head on.4
a. Integral to the Plan of Reorganization
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit finds nonconsensual thirdparty releases permissible when supported by specific details about necessity and importance to
the plan.5 In In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Grp., Inc., the Second Circuit upheld an injunction
against creditors from suing a third-party, given that the injunction played an “important role” in
the debtor’s reorganization.6 However, in 2005, with In re Metromedia Fiber Network, Inc., the
Second Circuit established a more restrictive application of its “importance” requirement.7 The
Metromedia Court found the nonconsensual third-party releases impermissible because they
were not supported by specific details about necessity and importance to the plan.8 The
Metromedia Court cited Drexel in its finding that the releases were impermissible, however the
requirement of specificity is seemingly one that the Drexel opinion lacks.9 While the Metromedia
Court does not mention the Sixth Circuit Dow Corning opinion, the requirement of specificity
perhaps indicates the Second Circuit’s movement toward the Dow Corning factors.10

Cir. 1989); In re Dow Corning Corp., 280 F.3d 648 (6th Cir. 2002); In re Airadigm Commc’ns, Inc., 519 F.3d 640,
656 (7th Cir. 2008); In re Seaside Eng’g & Surveying, Inc., 780 F.3d 1070, 1079 (11th Cir. 2015).
4
See In re Monarch Life Ins. Co., 65 F.3d 973 (1st Cir. 1995) (upholding a permanent injunction which extended
protection to third-party defendants in a plan of reorganization based on promissory estoppel principles); In re AOV
Indus., 792 F.2d 1140 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (suggesting that adequate compensation must be provided to a creditor that is
forced to release claims against non-debtor, third parties).
5
See In re Metromedia Fiber Network, Inc., 416 F.3d 136, 143 (2d Cir. 2005).
6
960 F.2d at 293 (finding the Settlement Agreement was an “essential element” to the plan by limiting the number
of lawsuits brought against the company’s former directors and officers and incentivizing the directors and officers
to settle).
7
416 F.3d at 143.
8
See id. (noting that the lower court’s only justification for granting the third-party releases was that the Trust
Contribution was a “material contribution” to the estate).
9
See id.; Drexel, 960 F.2d at 293.
10
See In re Metromedia, 416 F.3d at 143; In re Dow Corning Corp., 280 F.3d 648 (6th Cir. 2002) (requiring specific
factual findings and detailed evidence to support the releases).
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More recently, in In re Millennium Lab Holdings II, LLC, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the majority of circuits’ approval of nonconsensual thirdparty releases; finding them to be a constitutional exercise of a bankruptcy court’s authority
where “integral to the restructuring of the debtor-creditor relationship.”11 There, the court relied
on whether the nonconsensual third-party release was “critical to the success of the plan”
meaning the releases were “necessary to both obtaining the funding and consummating a plan,”
and “without [prepetition shareholders’] contributions, there [would be] no reorganization.”12
b. Balancing Test
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in In re Dow Corning Corp.,
held that section 524(e) merely explains the effect of a debtor’s discharge, but does not prohibit
the release of a non-debtor.13 Further, the Sixth Circuit reasoned that section 105 empowers
bankruptcy courts “to take appropriate equitable measures needed to implement other sections of
the Code.”14 In its opinion the Sixth Circuit combined the reasoning of its sister circuits to
articulate a seven-factor balancing test for allowing nonconsensual releases:
(1) There is an identity of interests between the debtor and the third party, usually
an indemnity relationship, such that a suit against the non-debtor is, in essence, a
suit against the debtor or will deplete the assets of the estate; (2) The non-debtor
has contributed substantial assets to the reorganization; (3) The injunction is
essential to reorganization, namely, the reorganization hinges on the debtor being
free from indirect suits against parties who would have indemnity or contribution
claims against the debtor; (4) The impacted class, or classes, has overwhelmingly
voted to accept the plan; (5) The plan provides a mechanism to pay for all, or
substantially all, of the class or classes affected by the injunction; (6) The plan
provides an opportunity for those claimants who choose not to settle to recover in
full and; (7) The bankruptcy court made a record of specific factual findings that

11

945 F.3d 126, 135 (3d Cir. 2019).
Id. at 137.
13
280 F.3d 648 (6th Cir. 2002); see 11 U.S.C. § 524(e).
14
In re Dow Corning Corp., 280 F.3d at 656.
12
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support its conclusions.15
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has also adopted those factors.16 The
Eleventh Circuit noted that in determining whether to approve a non-debtor release in a proposed
plan, the bankruptcy court should have discretion to decide which of the factors will be relevant
in each case.17
In 2014, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in National Heritage
Foundation, Inc. v. Highbourne Foundation, issued an opinion that substantially narrowed thirdparty release standards set out by prior Fourth Circuit precedent in In re A.H. Robins Co., Inc.18
In In re A.H. Robins Co., Inc., the Fourth Circuit upheld an injunction barring suits by creditors
against certain third-parties including the company’s directors and lawyers.19 There, the court
rejected a literal application of section 524(e) and instead considered that the plan was
“overwhelmingly approved” and that the plan gave a “second chance for late claimants to
recover.”20 The In re A.H. Robins Court elaborated “where the entire reorganization hinges on
the debtor being free from indirect claims,” section 524(e) of the Bankruptcy Code does not limit
the equitable power of the bankruptcy court from enjoining those claimants.21 However, the
National Heritage Court took a different approach and denied third-party releases that would
enjoin claims against the debtor’s directors and officers where application of the Sixth Circuit’s

15

Id. at 658 (citing In re A.H. Robins, 880 F.2d 694, 701–02 (4th Cir. 1989); MacArthur Co. v. Johns-Manville
Corp. (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 837 F.2d 89, 91 (2d Cir. 1988); In re Cont’l Airlines, 203 F.3d 203, 213 (3d Cir.
2000)).
16
See In re Seaside Eng'g & Surveying, Inc., 780 F.3d 1070, 1079 (11th Cir. 2015).
17
Id. (“the factors should be considered a nonexclusive list of considerations, and should be applied flexibly, always
keeping in mind that such bar orders should be used “cautiously and infrequently,” and only where essential, fair,
and equitable.”) (internal citations omitted).
18
See Nat’l Heritage Found., Inc. v. Highbourne Found., 760 F.3d 344, 351 (4th Cir. 2014); In re A.H. Robins Co.,
Inc., 880 F.2d 694 (4th Cir. 1989).
19
880 F.2d at 694.
20
Id. at 702.
21
Id.
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Dow Corning factors resulted in the satisfaction of only one factor.22 The court determined that
the releases were not essential.23 The court explained that despite an identity of interest between
the debtor and its directors and officers, there was no evidence the debtor faced “a strong
possibility of suits that would trigger its indemnity obligation, much less that such suits would
threaten its reorganization.”24
c. Congressional Intent
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit considered congressional
intent when assessing whether section 524(e) barred nonconsensual third-party releases. Relying
on Congress’s past specificity with limitations on the bankruptcy court, the Seventh Circuit, in
In re Airadigm Commc’ns Inc., hypothesized that if Congress intended to include such a limit, “it
would have used the mandatory terms “shall” or “will” rather than the definitional term ‘does’”
and that “it would have omitted the prepositional phrase ‘on, or ... for, such debt,’ ensuring that
the ‘discharge of a debt of the debtor shall not affect the liability of another entity”’ – whether
related to a debt or not.”25 Thus, the Seventh Circuit approves of non-debtor releases where the
release is necessary to the reorganization plan and appropriately tailored.26 However, the court
wanted to specifically sidestep blanket immunity and keep its view limited to applicable
circumstances such as claims arising out of or in connection with the reorganizing itself.27
Ultimately the majority view agrees that nonconsensual third-party releases are
permissible in limited and appropriate circumstances.28 However, among the majority view, there
is no uniform standard to follow in determining when nonconsensual third-party releases are
22

Nat’l Heritage Found., Inc., 760 F.3d at 351.
Id.
24
Id.
25
519 F.3d 640, 656 (7th Cir. 2008).
26
Id. at 657.
27
Id.
28
See Third-Party Releases in Bankruptcy Plans, Practical Law Practice Note 3-570-7925.
23
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appropriate.29 The consensus is that it is fact specific and should be determined on a case-by-case
analysis.30 Some general factors these courts consider in evaluating whether to grant third-party
releases or injunctions include “whether they are essential to the reorganization, whether the
parties being released have made or are making a substantial financial contribution to the
reorganization, and whether affected creditors overwhelmingly support the plan.”31
B. Minority View
The minority view, held by the United States Courts of Appeals for the Fifth, Ninth, and
Tenth Circuits, bans nonconsensual releases on the basis that they are prohibited by section
524(e) of the Bankruptcy Code, which provides generally that "discharge of a debt of the debtor
does not affect the liability of any other entity on, or the property of any other entity for, such
debt."32
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has found that bankruptcy courts
lack the authority to grant third-party releases on the basis that the releases have consequences
not intended by Congress.33 The Fifth Circuit acknowledges the exception carved into section
524(g) which permits bankruptcy courts to enjoin third-party asbestos claims under certain
circumstances. However, the court distinguished between asbestos claim cases and other cases
involving mass tort claims. Despite the similarities between asbestos claim cases and mass tort

29

See id.
Id.
31
Andrew M. Butler, In Millennium, the Third Circuit Gives Nonconsensual Third-Party Releases in a Chapter 11
Plan a Stern Look, JONES DAY (April 2020), https://www.jonesday.com/en/insights/2020/04/the-third-circuit-givesthirdparty-releases-a-ster.
32
11 U.S.C. § 524(e); See In re Pac. Lumber Co., 584 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2009); Resorts Int’l, Inc. v. Lowenschuss
(In re Lowenschuss), 67 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1995); In re W. Real Estate Fund, Inc., 922 F.2d 592 (10th Cir.
1990); see also Zacarias v. Stanford Int’l Bank, Ltd., 945 F.3d 883 (5th Cir. 2019) (third parties making substantial
contributions to the receiver in the R. Allen Stanford Ponzi scheme are entitled to an order barring creditors from
suing on the creditors' claims), petition for rehearing en banc denied, No. 17-11073 (5th Cir. Jan. 21, 2020).
33
See In re Pac. Lumber Co., 584 F.3d at 252 (“We see little equitable about protecting the released non-debtors
from negligence suits arising out of the reorganization.”).
30
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claims cases against debtors, the Fifth Circuit does not believe that 524(g) gives the bankruptcy
court authority beyond its power to enjoin mass tort claims in asbestos claims cases.
Similarly, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has repeatedly held,
without exception, that a global non-debtor release in a Chapter 11 case violates section 524(e).34
In In re Lowenschuss, the Ninth Circuit noted that “section 105 does not authorize relief
inconsistent with more specific law,” and concluded that “the specific provisions of section 524
displace the court’s equitable powers under section 105 to order the permanent relief [against a
non-debtor] sought by [the debtor].”35
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has consistently recognized that
section 524(e) precludes the debtor’s injunction from extending to non-debtors. In In re W. Real
Estate Fund, Inc., the Tenth Circuit stated that “a bankruptcy court’s supplementary equitable
powers [under § 105] may not be exercised in a manner that is inconsistent with other, more
specific provisions of the Code.”36 With its decision the Tenth Circuit explicitly indicated that
they were following “the lead” of the Ninth Circuit while adding to its reasoning that “not only
does such a permanent injunction improperly insulate non-debtors in violation of section
524(e),” but does so also “without any countervailing justification of debtor protection.”37
Conclusion
United States Courts of Appeals have been split on the permissiveness of nonconsensual
third-party releases since the 1980s. More recently, the high-profile nature of Purdue Pharma’s

34

See Lowenschuss, 67 F.3d at 1401; Am. Hardwoods, Inc. v. Deutsche Credit Corp. (In re Am. Hardwoods, Inc.),
885 F.2d 621, 626 (9th Cir. 1989); Underhill v. Royal, 769 F.2d 1426, 1432 (9th Cir. 1985).
35
Lowenschuss, 67 F.3d at 1402 (citing Am. Hardwoods, Inc., 885 F.2d at 626).
36
922 F.2d 592, 601 (10th Cir. 1990).
37
Id. at 602.
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bankruptcy, and its liability in mass tort cases related to the on-going Opioid Epidemic, has
spiked interest and outrage in relation to nonconsensual third-party releases.
In September 2021, the United States Bankruptcy Court in the Southern District of New
York, confirmed Purdue Pharma’s reorganization plan which contained third-party releases
eliminating claims held by creditors of Purdue directly against its owners, the Sackler family,
and other non-debtor entities, including claims arising from alleged willful misconduct and
fraud.38 In return, the Sackler family agreed to contribute approximately $4.5 billion to fund
charities and certain recoveries under the plan.39 On December 16, 2021, the District Court for
the Southern District of New York vacated the bankruptcy court’s confirmation and held that the
Bankruptcy Code did not grant the bankruptcy court statutory authority to approve
nonconsensual third-party releases in Purdue’s Chapter 11 plan.40 This decision upended the
understanding of third-party releases within the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit by calling into question previous decisions from the Second Circuit which had been
“widely interpreted as having left open a path in bankruptcy for approval of such releases in
‘rare’ or ‘unique’ circumstances.”41
Most recently, through mediation as well as approval from the bankruptcy court, the
Sacklers and Purdue Pharma reached a deal with a group of states that had long resisted the

38

In re Purdue Pharma L.P., 633 B.R. 53 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2021), vacated sub nom., In re Purdue Pharma, L.P., 635
B.R. 26 (S.D.N.Y. 2021), cert. of appealability granted, No. 21 CV 7532 (CM), 2022 WL 121393 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 7,
2022).
39
Id.
40
In re Purdue Pharma, L.P., 635 B.R. 26 (S.D.N.Y. 2021), cert. of appealability granted, No. 21 CV 7532 (CM),
2022 WL 121393 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 2022).
41
Jessica Liou, Brian Morganelli & Mark Polishuk, Chapter 11 Plans, Mass Torts, Releases & Exculpation, Third
Party Claims, What We’re Watching, WEIL RESTRUCTURING (Dec. 29, 2021),
https://restructuring.weil.com/releases-exculpations/in-vacating-purdue-pharmas-confirmation-order-the-districtcourt-determines-that-the-plans-nonconsensual-third-party-releases-are-not-statutorily-authorized/.
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company’s bankruptcy plan.42 Under the new settlement, the Sackler family will get their thirdparty release and an end to all current and future civil claims against them over the company’s
prescription opioid business. In return, the Sacklers will boost their cash contribution to as much
as $6 billion. An appeal on the new $6 billion settlement is set to be heard by the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals on April 29, 2022. Currently, there is little available information as to what
may happen to the new settlement on appeal.
Outside of the judiciary, legislative changes are pending with regards to third-party
releases. As a direct result of Purdue Pharma case, Democratic members of the U.S. House and
Senate introduced legislation intending to curb such releases.43 If passed into law, The Nondebtor
Release Prohibition Act of 2021, will have significant ramifications in many bankruptcy cases
going forward.44

42

Jan Hoffman, Sacklers and Purdue Pharma Reach New Deal With States Over Opioids, THE NEW YORK TIMES
(Mar. 3, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/03/health/sacklers-purdue-oxycontin-settlement html; Dietrich
Knauth, Jonathan Stempel & Tom Hals, Sacklers to pay $6 billion to settle Purdue opioid lawsuits, REUTERS (Mar.
4, 2022), https://www.reuters.com/business/healthcare-pharmaceuticals/sacklers-will-pay-up-6-bln-resolve-purdueopioid-lawsuits-mediator-2022-03-03/.
43
See Warren, Nadler, Durbin, Blumenthal, Maloney Announce Legislation to Eliminate Non-Debtor Releases,
Prevent Corporations and Private Entities From Escaping Accountability In Bankruptcy Proceedings, ELIZABETH
WARREN (July 28, 2021), https://www.warren.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/warren-nadler-durbinblumenthal-maloney-announce-legislation-to-eliminate-non-debtor-releases-prevent-corporations-and-privateentities-from-escaping-accountability-in-bankruptcy-proceedings.
44
See id. (indicating the new legislation would virtually eliminate the use of nonconsensual, non-debtor releases in
private claims and those brought by the government); see also Clinton E. Cutler, Is a Legislative Crackdown
Coming on Third Party Releases in Bankruptcy Plans?, FREDRIKSON & BYRON P.A. (Sept. 24, 2021),
https://www fredlaw.com/the_restructuring_report/is-a-legislative-crackdown-coming-on-third-party-releases-inbankruptcy-plans/.
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